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God, having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination and 
under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with 
language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society. 
 
John Locke 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
 
 
The standard view about language is roughly the one advanced by Locke in the epigraph above 
(only sans God):  Languages like Urdu, German, Polish and Portuguese are robust and fairly 
stable abstract systems of communication that are learned (with varying degrees of success) by 
human agents.  Those agents in turn use the languages that they have learned to communicate 
ideas, perform certain tasks (by giving orders, instructions, etc), and in some cases as media for 
artistic expression.  It is often argued that the better one learns a language, the better equipped 
one is to successfully communicate, accomplish complex tasks, etc.  Sometimes the standard 
view uses the metaphor of language as a widely shared common currency that agents use to 
communicate, with individuals words being the common coins of the realm.  Crucially, these 
common coins are fixed; as Locke argued, even Augustus, though he ruled the world, was unable 
to coin new Latin words. 
 
This standard view, although not universally held, is at least widely held by academics and lay 
persons alike, ranging from philosophers and language instructors, to anthropologists and 
computational linguists, to politicians and pundits.  Unfortunately, the standard view is badly 
mistaken, and its uncritical acceptance has had devastating consequences in all of these domains.  
It has led anthropologists to think that languages constrain the conceptual space of language 
users, and has led language departments into disastrous alliances with French philosophers of 
language and their word salad warfare on the hegemony of "language" and its alleged tendency 
to encode the interests of patriarchy and other evil powers.  It has led to wooden approaches to 
language instruction on the one hand and to failed attempts at human/machine communication on 
the other.  On the political end, it has led to silliness on both the left and the right by way of 
attempts to clean up or reform or otherwise render standard languages politically correct - a 
general sentiment that has led to downright discriminatory social policies like English Only laws, 
and in its extreme form, to attempts at language purification by Fascists like Mussolini.  
 
It would make for an interesting book to sort out all the ways in which the standard view of 
language has crept into these domains of human activity and the corrosiveness of its effect, but 
my goal here is substantially less ambitious.  I'll begin in part 1 with the negative case against the 
"common coin" view of language and offer an alternative in part 2. The alternative picture will 
be one in which there is a core part of our linguistic competence that is fixed by biology (perhaps 
by low level biophysical principles) but that this provides just a basic skeleton which is fleshed 
out in different ways on a conversation-by-conversation basis.  To shift back to the monetary 
metaphor, there are some common coins, but we also have the ability to mint new coins on the 
fly in collaboration with our discourse partners, to control which of those common coins are in 
circulation at any given time, and to coordinate and precisify the shared meanings of those 
common coins that are in use.  As we will see, for most linguistic common coins the meaning is 
vastly underdetermined.  I will suggest possible ways in which coins are minted and their values 
determined as discourse participants form dynamic communicative partnerships, resulting  (if we 
really must deploy the term 'language') in what we might call micro-languages.   In part 3 I will 
provide an example of how the received view has led us astray. 
 
1.0  The Myth of Human Language 
 
Let's begin by following Chomsky (1986) in making a distinction between I-language and E-
language.  Thus far, when talking about "language," I have been talking about language in the 
sense of E-language - that is, the conception of language as an "external" stable abstract object 
that is that is deployed by a large population of language users for purposes of communication.  
I-language, on the other hand, is Chomsky's term for the internal cognitive mechanisms that 
underwrite our linguistic competence.  
 
For most linguists, the traditional notion of an  E-language like Portuguese or German or English 
is suspect at best (see Chomsky 1980; ch. 6).  Consider the case of German, for example.  In 
what sense is a "speaker of German" from the Dutch border of Germany and a "speaker of 
German" from Bavaria speaking the same language?  (Especially given that their speech is not 
easily mutually intelligible?)  The fact that we say these individuals speak the same language is 
more of a political decision than anything else, and indeed an individual raised in northern 
Germany and an individual raised in The Netherlands may find that their languages are more 
mutually intelligible than the two aforementioned German citizens do.  As Max Weinreich is 
supposed to have said, "a language is a dialect with an army and a navy."  
 
Saying that two individuals "speak the same language" is at best a loose way of talking about 
some superficial similarities in style of communication that have been raised to salience for 
political and social reasons rather than linguistic reasons.  Chomsky (1994) compares it to saying 
that two cities are "near" each other; whether two cities are near depends on our interests and our 
mode of transportation and virtually not at all on brute facts of geography.  The notion of "same 
language" is no more respectable a notion in linguistics than "nearness" is in geography.  
Informally we might group together ways of speaking that seem to be similar (relative to our 
interests), but such groupings have no real explanatory power.  
 
One might try to retreat slightly by giving up on the idea of an E-language and endorsing a 
notion of E-dialect or E-idiolect, but even this retreat will not save the language-as-external-
object position.  Considerations that make it arbitrary when to say that two individuals speak the 
"same language" also apply to saying when they speak the "same dialect."  That is, do the people 
in this village speak the same dialect as the people in the next village?  Do we speak the same 
dialect as our next door neighbors?  For that matter do we speak the same dialect as the people 
living under the same roof? My ex-wife pronounced the words 'Mary', 'marry', and 'merry' 
differently, while I pronounced them the same.  Did we speak the same dialect?  Do we?  It 
depends on whether we want to identify with each other, and this is a kind of very local political 
decision. 
 
At this point you might think we could retreat to a notion of E-idiolect - in other words, that there 
is an abstract thing that people speak, but it varies from person to person; each person has their 
own personal E-language.  Even this is wrong (and it is certainly a mistake to conflate the notion 
of I-language with that of an idiolect - the notions cross-cut each other). 
 
The problem with the notion of an E-idiolect is that we have no way of identifying the linguistic 
forms that would be part of a given individual's E-idiolect.  Consider a hypothetical agent, 
Chesner.   Chesner speaks in different ways with different groups of individuals (say Chesner 
uses a different vocabulary among philosophers than among family members) and indeed at 
different stages of life (contrast Chesner’s use of language at age 3 and age 30).  Do all of these 
ways of speaking count as being part of the same idiolect? What unifies them other than that they 
are ways in which Chesner happens to have spoken? 
 
Of course one might argue that in this discussion I have more or less introduced a perfectly 
acceptable notion of language - one that is defined in terms of political identity etc.   But the 
problem is that this notion of language, to the extent it is coherent, plays no explanatory role.  
Why do certain people communicate with each other so well?  It is no answer to be told that they 
speak the same language.  This is like saying that wood burns because it contains phlogiston or 
(to borrow a joke from Moliere) that opium makes one sleep because it has a "dormative virtue".    
In effect, we have expunged God from Locke's story about language, but the remaining picture 
still has all the explanatory power of intelligent design theory in biology: none. 
 
What we are looking for here is some way of understanding how people are able to successfully 
communicate.  Being told they speak "the same language" is no answer to this question, and in 
fact it leads us away from the answer; we want to probe the mechanisms that underwrite their 
ability to communicate.  If we pursue these questions in a serious fashion, then we are driven far 
from the initial picture of a widely shared common coin system of communication.   
 
2.0  The FLN and the LCS 
 
Some writing on language tends to treat linguistic competence as a unified phenomenon, perhaps 
supervening on a single mechanism or module of human cognition.  It seems more reasonable to 
suppose that the broad class of phenomena that we call "linguistic" or think of as having to do 
with "language" are supported by a combination of narrow mechanisms of the mind/brain (what 
Chomsky calls the FLN, for "faculty of language narrowly construed") and at the same time an 
entirely different set of abilities that are underwritten by world knowledge and various 
coordination strategies that we deploy.  It seems doubtful that these coordination strategies are 
grounded in any single module of human cognition, but we can use the acronym LCS -linguistic 
coordination strategies - to speak of this broad class of abilities. 
 
 
2.1  the FLN 
 
Chomsky has argued that the FLN is a natural object that is part of our biological endowment.  
Recent work by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) has speculated that the mechanisms that 
underlie this core linguistic competence did not evolve gradually in response to selectional 
pressures, but was sudden in evolutionary terms and involved what in effect amounts to a bio-
physical wiring solution - a solution for hooking up the perceptual/articulatory system (the 
system that affords speech comprehension and production) with the conceptual/intentional 
system (the system that interprets and uses linguistic communication).  The thesis is speculative, 
but not without supporting evidence.  In the simplest form, support for the thesis involves the 
observation that low level physical and mathematical principles underlie many of the recursive 
patterns that we see in nature - ranging from the spiral patterns that we see in shells to the 
Fibonacci patterns we see in the distribution of seeds in a sunflower.   
 
To illustrate the recursiveness of natural language, consider the following very simple case. 
 
(1)  This is the cat that ate the rat that ate the cheese that was made by the farmer that… 
 
These sorts of patterns, in Chomsky's view, provide some of the evidence that the structure of the 
FLN is largely determined by basic biophysical properties. 
 
It is reasonable to think that the FLN also underwrites significant aspects of the lexicon as well.  
This certainly seems to be the conclusion one would draw from work by Mark Baker (1988) 
which argues that that morphological and lexical properties are actually determined by the 
syntax.    Following Higginbotham (1989) we can illustrate the basic idea by consider the 
following fragment from Lewis Carroll's poem "The Jabberwocky". 
 
(2)  Twas bryllyg, and the slythy toves did gyre and gymble in the wabe… 
 
Just from the surrounding syntactic environment we can deduce quite a bit about the meaning of 
the term 'tove'.  We know, for example, that toves are the sorts of things one can count (unlike 
substances like water), that they are spatially located and can move and undergo state changes 
(unlike numbers), they are quite possibly capable of acting under their own volition.  All of this 
is defeasible, but these are reasonable suppositions to deduce from the surrounding linguistic 
structure. 
 
Given the rapid acquisition of lexical items by children during their critical learning period (ages 
1.5-6) and given their corresponding acquisition of and grasp of these basic thematic relations 
(provided only impoverished data, no reinforcement, etc) it seems reasonable to speculate that 
these thematic relations are part of the FLN.  But as Bloom (2002) has argued, all of this just 
gives children a first pass at understanding word meanings.  To flesh things out children also 
need to incorporate a broad range of contextual information real world knowledge.  Of course, 
Bloom is assuming that there is “a meaning” to be learned.  As I will argue below, it is more 
precise to say that children, like adults, must ultimately collaborate with their discourse partners 
to establish word meanings. 
 
2.2  The LCS 
  
While the FLN is often deployed in communicative endeavors, it is generally a very small part of 
such endeavors.  As suggested earlier, it is, in effect, a kind of thin, rigid, skeleton onto which 
other types of abilities must be added for communication to be possible. What we need to 
understand are the natures of those abilities - in particular the LCS -- the ways they interact with 
the FLN, and the consequences that can be extruded from the emerging picture. 
  
The Dynamic Lexicon 
  
minting new coins. One crucial element in this new point of departure has to do with the lexicon 
itself.  As noted above, most philosophers of language suppose that the words we use are 
"common coin" in a broad social context -- that when you learn a language, among other things 
you learn a set stock of shared word meanings.  Rejecting this picture, we can opt instead for the 
idea that many of the terms that we use are invented "on the fly" during individual conversations.  
 
In effect this is a generalization of conclusions that have been reached by psycholinguists (e.g. 
Garrod and Anderson 1987, Brennan 1986, Brennan and Clark 1996, and Clark 1992) and their 
study of lexical "entrainment" -- a process whereby the use of certain words - sometimes novel 
words -- are introduced on the fly by discourse participants.     
 
Studies on entrainment also undermine the myth of a common-coin lexicon by showing that even 
individuals who overhear or witness a conversation are in a much weaker position to understand 
what is being said than are the participants.  Schober and Clark (1987), for example, show that 
discourse participants are in a much better position than eavesdroppers at understanding what is 
being said because participants are involved in the introduction of the lexical items that will be 
employed in the evocation of certain concepts. 
 
Consider, for example, how much of a lecture you can comprehend by dropping in on a course in 
the middle of the term.  If you are not familiar with the subject you may well be quite lost, and 
not just because you lack familiarity with the objects under discussion (if it is a philosophy class 
you might have dropped in on an unintelligible discussion of whether tables and chairs exist).  
One obstacle you may face is that you are unfamiliar with the terminology in play (of course, 
grasp of the terminology and knowledge of the subject matter are not so easily separated - more 
on this a bit later).  You were not involved in the entrainment process whereby certain terms 
were introduced into the course.  In such a situations you may dismiss the terms being used as 
"jargon", but this is just a way of saying that you don't understand the terms being deployed. 
 
Common coins placed in and out of circulation.  One important result of the entrainment 
experiments is that those common coins that do exist are not always in circulation, and indeed, 
are strategically retired and placed back into circulation depending upon the demands of the 
micro-language under construction. The situation is analogous to the position of the traveler who 
finds that various combinations of US Dollars, Euros, Yen, and Argentinean Pesos are accepted 
in different settings.  Some are more widely accepted than others, and some can be introduced in 
the odd transaction with a bit of cajoling, but at the end of the day there are still establishments 
where only a Peso will do.  Linguistic common coins are like this too, but their deployment is 
more strategic. 
 
The experiments on entrainment are particularly illuminating here because they show that 
additional common coins are introduced into the micro-language in response to conversational 
demands on the discrimination of the concepts being deployed.  If similar concepts are being 
deployed (and the greater the need to discriminate concepts and kinds of objects), there is 
increased pressure to reissue certain coins. 
 
common coins are thin. Linguistic common coins, whether in circulation frequently or rarely, are 
"thin." By that I mean that the shared part of the lexicon consists of just hints and clues (like one 
finds in dictionary entries) that may help us to deploy cognitive resources to flesh out the word 
meanings, and the way we flesh them out will vary according to contexts and social settings.  A 
classic illustration would be the dummy terms like 'whatchamacallit' and 'thingamajigger', which 
are reissued often but typically with different denotations each time they are reissued.    
 
Another example of this is the meaning of the term 'good'.  This is a widely shared common 
linguistic coin, but there is much to its meaning that is underdetermined.  For example, it is a 
typical phenomenon of sports talk radio to debate which of two sports stars is better.  Was 
Mickey Mantle better than Barry Bonds at baseball?  Well, one of them hit more home runs, but 
the other was on more championship teams.  One of them may have cheated by using steroids.  
Should that be a factor?  What is really up for grabs here is the question of what counts as a 
"good" baseball player - it is about the meaning of 'good'. 
 
Jamie Tappenden (1999) offers a formal example of this phenomenon, introducing a language in 
which some meanings are open-ended and to be precisified at a later time.  The language leaves 
"certain objects as 'unsettled' cases of a given predicate, in that it is open to the speakers of the 
language to make a further stipulation that the object is, or is not, to be counted as having the 
property in question." 
 
As Tappenden notes, these cases happen frequently both unintentionally and intentionally 
outside of formal languages, with an example of intentional cases coming from the realm of law: 
 
This happens with some frequency in law: it may be convenient to stipulate a condition for only 
a restricted range, leaving further stipulation for the future. There have been many different 
reasons for such reticence: courts have wanted to see how partial decisions fly before resolving 
further cases, higher courts may want to allow lower courts flexibility in addressing unexpected 
situations, legislatures may be unable to come to the needed political compromises without 
leaving 'blanks' for courts to fill in. 
 
Tappenden is thinking of cases in which matters are intentionally left open, but we can imagine 
lots of reasons why aspects of word meaning might remain open as a kind of natural default state 
- it may simply be too complicated to specify everything (even for an expert) or it may be that 
crucial aspects of word meaning depend upon facts about the world that remain open.  Or it may 
just be that the FLN is only accidentally suitable for communication and that for no reason in 
particular it just happens not to fix robust lexical meanings. 
 
It would be a mistake, I think, to try an assimilate these cases of open meanings to that of vague 
predicates like 'bald'.  Many of the disputes that arise have little to do with vagueness.  Too see 
this, consider the following case from a dispute I heard on WFAN (a sports talk radio station in 
New York) when Sports Illustrated announced its "50 greatest athletes of the 20th Century".  
Some listeners called in complaining that a horse - Secretariat - had made the list, while host 
Mike Francessa defended the choice.  Clearly this is a dispute about what should be in the 
extension of 'athlete', and the callers wanted to argue that a horse had no place here.  It is not as 
though the dispute would be resolved if Secretariat were a little bit faster or could throw a 
baseball, so it seems hard to imagine that these are vagueness cases. 
 
This is also a good example of a case where fleshing out the meaning of the term is up to us and 
our communicative partners. So, even when we are deploying a common coin term (like 'athlete', 
for example) the extension of the term within a given context may be up for grabs and may 
require some form of coordination strategy - in the sports talk radio case the coordination took 
the form of a debate where discourse participants argued their respective cases. 
  
At least in this narrow instance there is an obvious similarity to the legal realm, where competing 
parties may come together to resolve a dispute - in this case the way in which the term is to be 
understood with respect to the new cases in question (think of question of whether an existing 
patent “reads on” (applies to) some new technology).  The key difference is that rather than 
taking place in a formal courtroom setting, these debates play out in less formal realms, ranging 
from sports talk radio to arguments with colleagues, friends, and partners. 
 
Assigning meanings to common coins by jurisdiction.  Tappenden's metaphor of court decisions 
can be extended in fruitful ways.  Disputes over the best baseball player or whether a horse 
counts as an athlete are often just wheel spinning, but sometimes a consensus is achieved.  This 
might be due to a series of rational arguments or it might be a simple case of someone asserting a 
claim and other participants deferring.  In a bit we will look at how this kind of deference works, 
but first it is worth noting that when these disputes are resolved there are often jurisdictional 
limits. 
 
When courts come to a decision on a particular dispute they set a precedent which may carry 
over into other jurisdictions.  On the other hand it may not.  Similarly, we may resolve a dispute 
or coordinate on the meaning of a term, and expect that to carry over into other micro-languages 
that we form.  We may be disappointed to find we have to re-argue our point of view, or re-
establish our credentials.  
 
Alternatively, it may be that some of the disputes that we engage in (about sports, television, 
movies, and questions like "Is Chesner a smoker if he only smokes when drinking?") which 
appear trivial or silly are valuable precisely because they are litigating the content of certain key 
terms and this may be valuable in contexts where more is at stake and communication is critical.  
In other words, idle talk may well serve the function of helping us to calibrate our lexicons 
during periods of down time.  These periods of calibration may be serve us well later when we 
later need to collaborate on some important project or problem. 
 
Assigning meanings to common coins by deference. Sometimes we may not be involved in 
litigating the meaning of a term, but we may rather defer to the usage of someone (perhaps in the 
conversation, or perhaps in the greater community).  To use a famous example from Hilary 
Putnam, we may defer to an expert on the proper individuating conditions of the terms 'beach' 
and 'elm'.  There may be a social division of labor involved in fixing the semantic content of our 
utterances. 
  
It is one thing to say that semantic deference takes place and quite another to explain how it 
works.  Friend and Ludlow (2004) considered the thesis that deference-worthiness is earned 
discursively via a series of challenges.  More precisely, we argued that expertise in a domain 
must be established via a series of interactive "partial knowledge proofs." 
 
The phrase 'partial knowledge proof' is a riff on the notion of "zero knowledge proofs" in 
computer science (in particular in the field of public key cryptography).  The basic idea of a 
partial knowledge proof is this:  if I have a particular expertise, how can I prove to you that I 
have that expertise when it is something that you lack? To illustrate the idea, imagine a situation 
where we are hiring a philosopher in ancient philosophy but no one in the department is an 
expert in the area.  We all have some knowledge of ancient philosophy, of course, but we are 
hiring in the area because we recognize we are not experts.  We resolve this dilemma by issuing 
a series of challenges to the job candidate.  With each question/answer exchange we learn more, 
allowing our colleagues to press on with deeper and more informed questions.  In the end, via 
this interactive inductive proof procedure, we satisfy ourselves that the candidate is worthy.  Or 
not. 
 
Stacie Friend and I argued that this kind of procedure is more typical than one might think, 
applying even in cases like the meaning of the word 'cool' (in the social not the thermodynamic 
sense).  We might think that Richie and Pottsie always blindly defer to Fonzie on the meaning of 
'cool', but in fact there are times when challenges are issued, and there are at least person-internal 
debates about whether Fonzie is really the appropriate arbiter of the extension of the term.  
Fonzie's deference-worthiness is constantly subject to challenge, and may well be undermined as 
we encounter other arbiters of cool (as when Richie goes to college) or about Fonzie (as when he 
goes water skiing and jumps a penned up shark - definitely not cool). 
 
It is an interesting question as to what counts in a decision to defer to Fonzie on the meaning of 
'cool'.  Presumably Richie and Pottsie had partial knowledge of the concept, and their deference 
is not tied to credentials possessed by Fonzie; Fonzie did not have a diploma from the College of 
Cool.  In other cases, however, semantic deference does appear to be tied to credentials. 
 
For example, one day a "tree guy" came to my house and while pruning some trees, identified the 
trees in my yard.  Along the way he assured me he had gone to horticulture school.  Did that 
provide him with the expertise to say what is a beech and what is an elm?  Should I defer to him?  
Well, not much hung on the question, so I was perfectly happy to adopt his usage.  For similar 
reasons I'm happy to defer to the doctor when she says I can't have arthritis in my thigh. But why 
do I defer? 
 
Well, presumably it is not because these experts have pointy heads or impressive accents - it is 
because the credentials they hold (diplomas for example) that show they have been vetted by a 
kind of process not so different from the one we used to hire our Ancient philosopher - as 
students they were subject to an interactive inductive proof procedure which convinced their 
institutions that they had the relevant domain knowledge.  It would be interesting to explore this 
process in more detail, when we turn to the semantics of word meaning a more pressing question 
arises:  why does your domain expertise matter here? 
 
The point of my question is that once domain expertise is established, the "semantic reach" of the 
domain expertise must be also established (e.g. should I defer to the materials scientist when she 
says that the glass in that window falls under the extension of 'liquid' in our conversation?  Or is 
the materials scientist overreaching her jurisdiction when she asks us to adopt her linguistic 
usage?). In Ludlow and Friend (2004), we consider the thesis that this semantic reach must also 
be established discursively, via a series of challenges.  But clearly this doesn't happen all the 
time.  Nor should it. 
  
Copycats. There is obviously a lot going on here - a combination of coordination strategies, 
litigation of deference and semantic reach, and the creative coining and fleshing out of lexical 
items.  But in addition to all this there are presumably also cases of just flat out copying as well - 
cases where we blindly or at least indifferently adopt the linguistic practices of those around us, 
apparently for no reason at all.  Well, maybe it is for no reason.  
 
It is certainly the case the human agents are quite adept at simply doing as their neighbors do.  In 
the United States someone started driving on the right hand side of the road, and everyone else 
followed suit. Similarly, we eat our pie with the wedge pointing towards us.   It seems doubtful 
that anyone debated the issue.  Joshua Epstein (2001) has shown that one can successfully model 
group political behavior with a population of cellular automata that basically just do what their 
neighbors do as long as no new agent comes along and violates conventions.   
 
It is interesting to reflect on whether this behavior, hardwired or not, could count as being 
rational or normative in some sense.  Surely some unreflective imitation must be warranted. It 
would certainly make for an interesting time if all conformity required pause for reflection.  
Quite apart from making driving an adventure, many of us would simply be paralyzed with 
indecision.  One can easily imagine a semantic theory that established our warrant for reflexively 
following our neighbors when they introduce novel lexical items or when they offer 
precisifications and adaptations of those already in use. (The case for warrant would parallel 
recent work on perceptual warrant by philosophers like Burge (2003)). 
 
There are moments however, when it is time to reflect on the imitative behavior we are engaged 
in, and this is true when we engaged in the assignment of word meanings no less than when we 
are engaged in the overtly political.  Application conditions for terms and phrases like 'murder', 
'life', 'family values', and 'good character' must be fleshed out and precisified, and it would seem 
to be a mistake to just blindly follow our neighbors or the powerful on their precisifications.  
Here is a place where we want to insist on deliberation and good reasons for a choice. 
 
Power relations in lexical choice 
 
Here is also the place where we see the role of power relations.  It is not rare at all to find power 
relations in linguistic interactions, and they are reflected in everything from the pronunciation we 
adopt to the coining and precisification of lexical items.  Sometimes discourse participants will 
attempt to "impose their will" on their discourse partners, even in the face of resistance, and 
sometimes we comply even when we don't like it.   I suppose this happens in the classroom all 
the time, but my favorite example comes from one of the entrainment experiments conducted by 
Susan Brennan (p.c). 
 
In one of the entrainment experiments, subjects were asked to coordinate on the selection of 
terms for certain pictures that they would subsequently use when showing each other the pictures 
again later in the experiment.  Transcripts of these experiments showed there to be little 
discussion of the choices - someone usually just called the shots.  But who?  And why did they 
get to call the shots? 
 
In some cases the shot-caller appeared to have real world knowledge which they took to establish 
a kind of semantic authority (e.g. knowledge of cars).  In other cases the transcripts are 
unilluminating, but one can imagine all sorts of factors ranging from relative age to dress to more 
discrete social factors.  And, as I suggested, sometimes the deference relation is recognized but 
not appreciated.  The case I have in mind involves an experimental subject that chose the word 
'rice burner' to refer to a picture of a Japanese car.  When the picture came up again the other 
subject complied with the coinage, but registered disapproval by referring to it as "your 'rice 
burner'." 
 
Notice though, that we are never compelled to defer – we are never prisoners to our own or 
someone else’s “language” as suggested by the following passage from Deleuze and Guattari, 
cited in Venuti (1995; 273). 
 
How many people today live in a language this is not their own?  Or no longer, or not yet, even 
know their own and know poorly the major language that they are forced to serve?  This is the 
problem of immigrants, and especially of their children, the problem of minorities, the problem 
of a minor literature, but also a problem for all of us:  how to tear a minor literature away from 
its own language, allowing it to challenge the language and making it follow a sober 
revolutionary path?  How to become a nomad and an immigrant and a gypsy in relation to one’s 
own language. 
 
We cannot be imprisoned by something that does not exist.   On the other hand we do need to be 
cautious in when and how we defer to the linguistic practices of our discourse partners, and we 
need to insist that semantic deference be paid only when it is warranted.  More to the point, the 
proper response to attempts at regimenting our linguistic practice is not to retreat into infantile 
word games, but rather to exercise care and creativity in clarifying the terms we wish to deploy, 
explaining their usages, and making sure that our discourse partners understand and respect these 
usages.  Care and clarity are the answer, not word salad. 
  
3.0  An Illustration 
 
My first job after I got my PhD in 1985, was not in academia, but working for the Intelligent 
Interface Systems Group of the Technology Strategies Center, run by the Honeywell 
Corporation.   My first assignment was to study the then existent machine translation projects - 
an assignment that sent me traveling to research centers around the world.  In those days, 
machine translation was crude, but in certain circumscribed contexts, it was economically viable 
to have machines do rough drafts of certain documents.  If necessary, the documents could be 
cleaned up by human translators. 
 
Back then, my computer was an Apple II with 48K of ram, and the computers we used at the 
center (Symbolics Lisp Machines) had substantially less power than the low end laptops 
available for a few hundred dollars today.  One might have thought that after 20 years significant 
advances in computing power we would also seen advances in machine translation and natural 
language "front ends" for data bases.  But we haven't.  And this is not the least bit surprising. 
 
Most of the work on machine translation and natural language processing has been based on a 
mistake - the idea that one has to find an algorithm that can take some text in a "source language" 
and in one stroke translate the text into the "target language."  But given that there are no 
languages, we can see that this is a confusion from the start. 
 
The next time you go to a bank or a store with a particular request, think about the way your 
conversation plays out.  Do you just make a request and receive an answer?  How many times 
have you had to ask the teller or the clerk to clarify something?  (The first time a bank clerk 
asked “Do you want that large?,” I had no idea what she wanted to know.) How many times has 
the teller or clerk asked you to clarify what you need?  How many times did you go back and 
forth with phrases like "sorry, did you mean…" or "I'm sorry, I didn't catch that" or "I'm not sure 
what it's called but I need something that…".  
 
Interesting work has been done on the nature of conversational repair, even including the 
important role that is played by expressions like ‘um’, ‘er’, and ‘hmmm’ in communication – so 
called “disfluencies.”   But even before we get to the role of these items we need to understand 
that the lexicon is not stable but must be recalibrated on a conversation-by-conversation basis.  
For example, in studying the way agents attempt to communicate with computers with natural 
language interfaces, Furnas et al. (1987) found that the likelihood that any two people would 
produce the same term for the same function ranged from only 7 to 18%. For example, when 
wishing to remove a file, persons used a broad range of terms including remove, delete, erase, 
expunge, kill, omit, destroy, lose, change, rid, and trash. You might think you could get around 
this problem by treating these terms as synonyms and having the system regard any of them as 
an instruction to delete a file, but as Furnas et al.  discovered, even with as many as 20 synonyms 
for a single function, the likelihood of people generating terms from the synonym set for a given 
function was only about 80%.  And then a new problem is generated.  When people do use the 
same term, more likely than not they don’t mean the same thing by the term. As Furnas et al. 
showed, even in a text editor with only 25 commands, if two people use the same verbal 
command, the chances that they intend same function by it was only 15%. 
 
In the light of these considerations think about how silly it is to try and build a machine that "just 
understands you" when you walk up and begin talking to it.  No human can "just understand 
you" and no machine will ever be able to do it - such a machine is a fantasy machine designed 
around the myth of language.  We don't speak languages, so if machines did they would be no 
use in communicating with us anyway.  If someone created a “perfect language” we would have 
no use for it. 
 
This point can be extended to human translation as well.  What is it that translators do?  They 
surely don't translate from one fixed “source language” to another fixed “target language.”  To 
see this consider the situation faced by two Serbian friends of mine who are translators from 
"English" into "Serbian".  One was translating Tolkein, the other was translating The Color of 
Purple.   Exactly how does one translate Elvish expressions or Rural Black English Vernacular 
into "Serbian" (one common and very unhappy strategy in Serbia is to translate Black English 
Vernacular into "Bosnian").  In point of fact translators are not in the business of translating so 
much extending and morphing the "target language" so as to communicate the ideas in the book.  
Pannwitz (1917) had an interesting insight on this score: 
 
The fundamental error of the translator is that he stabilizes the state in which his own language 
happens to find itself instead of allowing his language to be powerfully jolted by the foreign 
language. (from Venuti 1995; 148) 
 
Of course on my view, it is not that the translator's language is changing so much as the 
translator is establishing a micro-language with the readers of the so-called translation.  Direct 
coordination is out of the question, but assumptions about the knowledge and background of the 




The real mystery in all of this is the question of why persons find the myth of language so 
persuasive when they have so much evidence against it.  To sustain the myth they must ignore 
the dynamical nature of human communication, the widespread coining and reissue of novel 
terminology, the pervasive divergence in pronunciation and meaning, the repair strategies, the 
debates over and refinements of meaning and the alternating deference and conflicts over 
meaning, and still cling to the idea that there is a thing there – a language – that is helping us to 
communicate.  One wonders why everyone doesn’t come away with the impression expressed by 
James Joyce’s in Finnegan’s Wake: 
 
Because, Soferim Bebel, if it goes to that… every person, place and thing in the chaosmos of 
Alle anyway connected with the gobblydumbed turkey was moving and changing every part of 
the time: the traveling inkhorn (possibly pot), the hare and the turtle pen and paper, the 
continually more or less intermisunderstanding minds of the anticollaborators, the as time went 
on as it will variously inflected, differently pronounced, otherwise spelled, changeably meaning 
vocable scriptsigns.  No, so help me Petault, it is not a miseffectual whyacinthinous riot of blots 
and blurs and bars and balls and hoops and wriggles and juxtaposed jottings linked by spurts of 
speed:  it only looks as like it as damn it. 
 
Perhaps the problem is that we just cannot see how communication could emerge from this riot 
of blots and blurs and balls and hoops and wriggles; but somehow it does.  If we are interested in 
how it does, then we need to retire the standard picture and begin investigating the nature of our 
linguistic coordination strategies, their origin, and use, and then we need to get about the 
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